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UNION CAMPAIGN DOCUMENTS. NO. 5. 


THE 

MILITARY AND NAVAL SITUATION, 

AND THE 

GLORIOUS ACHIEVEMENTS 

OP OUR 

SOLDIERS AND SAILORS, 


BY WM. SWINTON,’ WASHINGTON EDITOR N. Y. TIMES. 

II 


L 

THE COURSE AND CONDUCT OF THE WAR. 

A wise maxim of the greatest general of an¬ 
tiquity prescribes that we should esteem nothing 
done till it is all done; but it is probable that its 
intent is rather to point out the danger‘of that 
indolent dwelling on the deeds of the past which 
shuts out of view the duties and demands of the 
present, than to discourage (especially when a 
great task is laid upon a nation) such a retrospect 
of what has already been accomplished as will 
inspire courage for carrying it through to the end. 

The country has lately passed through that 
trying experience which history shows is sure to 
come upon a people plunged into a great war, a 
period when the first popular enthusiasm having 
died out, the burdens and the bereavements of 
the war are brought kfeenly home to all, and 
a reaction of general despondency results. In 
this mood of the public mind men forget that 
while they have suffered the enemy also has suf¬ 
fered in an equal or even greater degree, and that 
too, perhaps, without the same ability to sustain 
his losses; they forget, while dwelling on their 
own defeats, that every victory they have won 
has been an equally sore defeat to the enemy. 
When this time comes then comes the test of the 
mettle of a people. If weak they sink under it; but 
the great-minded rise up stronger for the ordeal. 

The feeling of depression whiph but lately pre¬ 
vailed regarding the seemingly indefinite prolonga¬ 
tion of the war, and which is still felt by some, 
is a singular repetition of an experience which 
has frequently been felt by other nations con¬ 


ducting a long war. It has often happened that 
men on the very eve of the conclusion of a war 
have looked upon it as promising the longest 
duration; and it will be in the memory of many 
that just previous to the termination of the Cri¬ 
mean war, even as sagacious an observer as Mr. 
Cobden had just concluded proving in a pamphlet 
that it was certain to be prolonged for many years. 
It thus frequently happens that war, which in its 
practical execution deals so largely in deception, 
is itself the greatest of deceptions. When after 
years, perhaps, of strife, great armies still confront 
each other, it is hard to penetrate its outlet or 
issue; but some sudden turn of affairs precipi¬ 
tates the catastrophe long preparing and in the 
flames of a Waterloo, a Cannae, or a Pultowa, 
fabrics and systems seemingly firm-rooted and 
imperishable go out in ashes and nothingness. 

At the outbreak of the rebellion the public 
mind became possessed with illusive anticipations 
that the war would be a short one—that our 
victorious columns sweeping the rebels before 
them in their triumphant path would, in a few 
months at most, end by precipitating them into 
the Gulf of Mexico. This was a great delusion 
no doubt; but it was not more so than that other 
sentiment which lias arisen as the natural reac¬ 
tion after the rude shock this hope received—the 
error as to the indefinite prolongation of the war. 
The one fallacy is as pernicious as the other; for 
if the first was a great bar to the efficient execu¬ 
tion of the duty of putting down the rebellion 
(and there is no doubt that our illusions as to the 
ease and speediness with which the work would 
be accomplished was a serious hindrance to the 





50 


very preparations needed to make it short,) the 
other is an error equally fatal; for the paralysis 
of effort produced by the sentiment of the probable 
longness of the war is sure to make it much longer 
than it would otherwise be. There is no higher 
duty, therefore, than for patriotic men to fortify 
themselves and others by the consideration of all 
the elements of hope and confidence which a re¬ 
trospect of past progress and a survey of the. 
present situation inspire. 

Such a survey justifies the conclusion that the 
end of the war—the crushing of the armed 
forces of the rebellion—is not only not far off; but 
that it is near at hand, and that it is in our power 
to bring it about almost at a blow. 

It will show the outlines of a war continental 
in its proportions, waged on a theatre equal to 
the size of all Europe. 

It will show armies the greatest the world ever 
saw, raised and sustained by the spontaneous 
patriotism of a free people. 

It will show how, by the progress of our 
arms, the area of the rebellion has, step by step, 
been shorn of three-fourths of its proportions. 

It will show the insurgent territory, cut off 
from communication with the outside world by a 
blockade which dwarfs any on record, and at the 
same time the most perfect of any on record. 

It will show how every stronghold on the. 
coast has either been captured or is now closely 
invested. 

It will show the interior of this territory cut 
up by our great lines of conquest, bisected latter- 
ally and longitudinally, and the dominion of the 
confederacy left a kingdom of shreds and patches. 

It will show a succession of battles of colossal 
magnitude, in three-fourths of which the Union 
arms have triumphed, and all of which, whether 
victories or reverses, in a purely military point of 
view, have redounded to the advance of the 
great cause. 

It will show the manhood of a population 
defending free institutions, vindicating itself 
against years of the gibes and insolence born of 
the plantation. 

It will show the fighting population of the in¬ 
surgent States reduced , by battle , by disease , and 
by captures, from three-fourths of a million to be¬ 
tween a hundred and a hundred and fifty thousand 
men. 

It will show this force—the forlorn hope of 
the rebellion—separated by an interval of a 
thousand miles, divided into two armies, the one 
of which driven from Chattanooga to Atlanta, 
has at length been compelled to give up that 
point, the material capital of the confederacy, 
while the other is shut up in Richmond, the politi¬ 
cal capitol of the confederac) 7- . 

It will show that the annihilation of both these 
armies is a mathematical certainty, if we put 
forth the strength at our command. 

It will reveal, finally, as the result of all this, 
the radient figure of Peace hovering not afar off, 
and plainly visible through the cloud of war that 
still overspreads the land. 

If this be the magnificent result which we have 
to show for the three years of war for the Union, 
it will -give the people of the loyal States a crite¬ 
rion of action in the great issue now before the 


country—an issue that will determine whether by 
the maintenance of the Administration undor 
which the war has been conducted to these re¬ 
sults, and which can alone carry it through , we are 
willing to crown and justify all that has been done 
by a Peace that will vindicate and establish for¬ 
ever the unity and integrity of the nation; or 
whether we shall surrender our destinies into the 
hands of a party committed to a peace which 
makes the war for the Union a mockery—a party 
whose creed throws to the winds all that has 
been achieved by the toil and blood, the faith and 
the self-sacrifice of this nation, in the most terri¬ 
ble war in the world’s history, whose creed casts 
disgrace on every soldier under the sod, makes 
the heroic bones that on a hundred battle fields 
render the continent sacred the monuments of 
folly, which makes every sailor that has gone 
down at his guns for the love of the old flag a 
fool, and every man who wears the insignia of a 
glorious wound a poor simpleton; a creed, finally, 
the delusive peace resulting from which can only 
be the beginning of unending war. 

II. 

THE TASK LAID UPON THE ADMINISTRA¬ 
TION BY THE WAR. 

When overt war, begun by the firing on Fort 
Sumter in April, 1861, and brought to a head in 
the battle of Bull Run in the July following, had 
fairly inaugurated the rebellion against the con¬ 
stituted authorities of the United States, the Ad¬ 
ministration found itself committed to a struggle 
continental in its proportions. The task imposed 
upon it, as described in President Lincoln’s inau¬ 
gural, was to “ repossess the forts , places and pro¬ 
perty which had been seized from the Union." But 
to do this it was needed that the embodied power 
of the Government should sweep armed resist¬ 
ance from the whole territory of the insurgent 
States.. It is the nature of war like that of a con¬ 
flagration to involve and swallow up everything 
within its reach. The Southern heart “fired ” by 
a few powerful leaders, plunged into the war with 
a recklessness akin to madness, and from the Ohio 
to the gulf, from the Potomac to the Mexican bor¬ 
der was all aglow with red-hot rebellion. The 
Government accepted the task put upon it, for 
the people willed it, and it was the people’s war. 
Conscious of its strength, arousing itself as a 
giant from slumber, the nation accepted the gage 
of war for the Union. 

There are, however, certain considerations which, 
little thought of at the time, entered so deeply into 
the military problem then presented, have so in¬ 
fluenced the course of war and count for so much 
in a proper estimate of what has been accom¬ 
plished as to demand immediate statement here. 
They all go to show that the task of quelling 
the rebellion was much more difficult than was 
conceived at the time or than is commonly appre¬ 
hended even now. 

It is a common fallacy in estimating the amount 
of force the Government could bring to bear on 
the revolted States to state it merely in the ratio 
of the population of the two sections—twenty 
millions in the loyal States agginst eight in the 


svf/ 



51 


revolting States. But it is proper to consider that 
jthe rebels had within themselves a slave popula- 
Q*tion of over four millions, and that this population 
' was able to carry on all their simple industries, 
^ which it required more than double that number 
v to carry on the much more complicated industries 
rv °f northern civilization. It is thus apparent that 
v the whole fighting white population of the South 
w was vailable for service in the field, while nearlv 
S half of our own population was necessarily neutral- 
s ized in the way just mentioned. It is not wonder- 
^ ful, therefore, that the rebel leaders were able to 
put into the field, at the very start, armies nearly 
equal to our own, though our own levies were 
unparalleled in history. 

To this must be added the astonishing ascend¬ 
ancy which a small minority of leading men had 
acquired over the southern population, and by 
which, when they had once usurped power, they 
were able to wield an absolutely despotic control 
over all the resources of men and material in the 
South. These men, in fact, had long been pre¬ 
paring for this war, as many of them publicly con¬ 
fessed after the inauguration of the rebellion. 
“We have, ” said Mr. Barnwell Rhett, in a speech 
in the convention, which took South Carolina out 
of the Union, “we have been engaged in this war 
for more than thirty years. It is no consequence 
of Lincoln's election or the failure to execute the fugi¬ 
tive slave law, but we have been engaged in this war 
for more than thirty years." It is a thread-bare 
story how Buchanan’s infamous secretary had, 
for the last twelve months of that administration, 
bent all his energies to furnish forth the rebels 
with all they needed for their premeditated treason. 
It is a matter of official record that by the robbery 
of forts and arsenals, and by purchase from abroad, 
Floyd had distributed at various convenient points 
throughout the South, *707,000 stands of arms and 
200,000 revolvers. Even before Mr. Lincoln’s 
inauguration there were thirty thousand men 
under arms in the South; and two days after 
that inauguration the Confederate Congress passed 
a bill to raise an army of a hundred thousand men 
And this, bear in mind, was at a time when the 
United States Government had not under its con¬ 
trol an organized force of five thousand men. 

To enhance the difficulty of the task imposed 
on the administration, the theory of the war into 
which it was driven by the very nature of the 
contest was that of the offensive. Now military 
history is replete with illustrations of the enor¬ 
mous advantage which a people has when able to 
stand at bay (covering its own communications 
and holding interior lines) and await in chosen 
p.os^ions the attacks of the enemy. 

The career of Frederick the Great affords an 
eminent example of a small nation, never able to 
raise an army of oyer a. hundred thousand men, 
conducting a defensive war (with offensive re¬ 
turns), and successfully resisting for seven years 
the attempts of a collision of five of the leading 
Powers of Europe. But offensive operations 
against a people holding such defensive attitude 
becomes ten fold more difficult when the war be¬ 
comes what is called a “national war,” the nature 
of which is thus depicted by the greatest modern 
writer dn the theory of war, General Jomini : 


“ The difficulties in the path of an army in national 
wars are very great, and render the mission of the 
general conducting them very arduous. The invader 
has only an army; his adversaries have an army and 
a people wholly or almost wholly in arms, and making 
means of resistance out of everything Each indivi¬ 
dual conspires against the common enemy—even the 
non-combatants have an interest in his ruin, and accele¬ 
rate it by every means in their power. Each armed 
inhabitant knows the smallest paths and connections 
—he finds everywhere a relative or friend who aids 
him; the commanders also know the country, and 
learning immediately the slightest movement on the 
part of the invader can adopt the best measures to 
defeat his projects.” 

These embarrassments, enormously increased 
by the prodigious extent of the theatre of wai*, 
the topography of which is all against the offen¬ 
sive and in favor of the defensive (as witness tho 
immense depth of the lines of communication ic 
any great aggressive movements, the impossi¬ 
bility of supplying our armies from the country 
as is done in Europe, etc.,) entered into the por¬ 
tentous problem which the administration had to 
solve; and yet, in the face of this accumulation 
of difficulties, forming a task the gravest that ever 
met an Executive, the war has been pushed suc¬ 
cessfully through to the splendid results we wit¬ 
ness—the armies of the rebellion have been 
driven from the vast extent of territory tho rebels 
claimed till now the one is shut up in the States 
bordering on the Gulf, and the other is besieged 
without hope of escape to Richmond. 

III. 

THE UPRISING OF THE NATION. 

The response of the people to the call of Pre¬ 
sident Lincoln for men with which to execute fhe 
authority of the Government will always remain 
one of the grandest manifestations of the spon¬ 
taneous energy of a free people in the vindication 
of free institutions. It was then we saw that 
sublime “uprising” of the people, when all party 
differences were merged in enthusiastic devotion 
to the Union—or rather when armed loyalty 
cowed and quelled secret traitors who, driven to 
their lurking places, saw the prudence of await¬ 
ing some other opportunity to show their hands. 

After Bull Run had shown that an arduous arid 
protracted , war was before us, Mr. Lincoln issued 
his proclamation for 300,000 men. Tho response 
of the North to the call was without a parallel in 
the history of the world, and it was soon evident 
that more troops would be in the field than the 
act of Congress authorized. Within fifteen days 
it is estimated that 350,000 volunteers offered 
themselves in defense of our national flag. And 
from first to - last, under tho different calls, 'more 
than a MILLION AND A HALF of men have 
been under arms in the war for tho Union. There 
is in history but one example of a similar upris¬ 
ing of the people in defense of its nationality, and 
that is the rushing to arms of the French during 
the great revolution when threatened by the 
coalition. And yet the comparison only serves, 
to show how far even that fell short of what we 
have witnessed; for modern historians have 
proved that, notwithstanding all the exaggera¬ 
tions in regard to tho number of men raised by 
France at that epoch, the figure never exceeded 
500,000 men. Yet we have trebled that number. 



52 



Tho task now before the Government was her¬ 
culean, and *such as might have made even Napo¬ 
leon stand aghast. To raise and fit for the lielc 
an army of six hundred thousand men, to be sup¬ 
plied with- all the needs of a modern army, anc. 
that too without even the skeleton of a veteran 
force on which to build, was indeed a work of 
frightful magnitude. And yet this was accom¬ 
plished in the space of three months—an achieve¬ 
ment that has extorted the wonder and admira¬ 
tion of military men throughout tho world. 

IY. 

THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR. 

As the chief force of the rebellion—the head 
and front of the offending—was collected in Vir¬ 
ginia, it became a necessity to place here an 
army of proportions fitting it to foil the purpose 
of the enemy touching the capture of our capital, 
at tho same time to drive the opposing force out 
of Virginia. 

With this view a grand army of over 200,000 
men was collected at Washington and placed 
under command of Major General G. B. McClel¬ 
lan, whose name, from a series of successful 
minor operations in Western Virginia, which an¬ 
other than he had planned and executed, had 
acquired a halo that did not properly belong to it. 
It was not until sometime afterwards that the 
constitutional inactivity , which seems to be a part 
of General McClellan’s nature, and that secret 
sympathy with treason that has always made him 
tender of hurting traitors, began to be appre¬ 
ciated, • and hence it was that for many months 
our .armies were kept at a dead-lock, thus giving 
the rebels the opportunity to prepare their plans, 
and the rebellion its best ally, time, and we put 
in a position of humiliation before the world. 

There was one result springing from the pre¬ 
sence of our army in Virginia, however, which 
oven the generalship of McClellan could not pre¬ 
vent ; it thwarted the realization of those dreams 
of invasion that had fired the southern imagina¬ 
tion. A powerful party of red-hot belligerents 
had made the carrying of the war into northern 
soil their rallying cry. Washington was in par¬ 
ticular the object of their chief desires, and their 
direst hate. The Rebel Secretary of War boasted 
at Montgomery, on the 12th of April, that “ the 
flag which now flaunts the breeze here will float 
over the dome of the old Capitol at Washington 
before the 1st of July.” 

After Bull Run the same ambition fired these 
men. Said the Richmond Examiner: “ From the 
mountain tops and valleys to the shores of the 
sea there is one wild shout of fierce resolve to 
capture Washington city at all and every human 
effort.” But this “ wild shout of fierce resolve ” 
was vain against the 200,000 bayonets present to 
defend the capital; and though the early history 
of our army in Virginia was not of the character 
the people justly expected and the army eagerly 
desired, it was at least something, in view of 
these desperate projects of the rebels, that Wash¬ 
ington, by its presence, was rendered safe. 

But outside of the immediate influence of the 
McClellan strategy, a series of operations in the 
western theatre of war had been inaugurated, 


which laid the foundation of the splendid victo¬ 
ries of the Uuion arms in that quarter. While 
McClellan, during tire winter of 1861-2, kept his 
magnificent army of two hundred thousand men 
in inaction, maturing plans which he never 
matured, the early pages of the history of the 
war were lit up by a succession of brilliant vic¬ 
tories on tho Atlantic seaboard and west of the 
Mississippi river. Christmas of 1861 saw the 
powerful force of rebels, which had overrun Mis¬ 
souri, insolently proclaiming their purpose oi 
seizing St. Louis, driven down to the Arkansas 
border. General Grant had begun on a small 
scale the operations on the Mississippi, destined to 
swell into campaigns of colossal proportions. 
The first of our series of coast victories had been 
gained at Hatteras Inlet, (August 27,) giving us 
two forts, thirty-six guns, six hundred and nine 
teen prisoners, and the key to Albemarle sound. 
This was followed up, at the end of October, by 
Dupont’s exploit at Port Royal, one of the most 
memorable triumphs on record of ships over forts. 
The spoils of this victory included not less than 
fifty cannon. 

V., 

THE SECOND YEAR OF THE WAR. 

The opening of the second year of the war way 
gilded by two other victories on the coast—the 
capture of Roanoke Island by a combined attack 
of our land and naval forces, giving us six forts 
2,500 prisoners and forty-two guns, followed up 
promptly by the capture of Newbern, which 
added six other forts and thirty-four heavy guns. 
These conquests restored the sovereignty of the 
flag over all the inland waters of North Carolina, 
which, up to this time, had been the main resort 
of the whole crew of blockade runners. Another 
brilliant point in the chain of coast victories was 
added by the reduction and capitulation of Fort 
Pulaski following. With the'fort were surren¬ 
dered forty-seven guns and 360 prisoners. This 
gave us the control of the mouth of the Savannah 
river. 

Turning to the great theatre of war between 
the Alleghanies and the Mississippi, the spring of 
1862 saw there the inauguration of a combination 
of magnificent operations by several distinct col¬ 
umns drawn out from the Ohio to the mouth of 
the Mississippi, and destined to carry their con¬ 
quests into the very heart of the confederacy and 
reclaim the valley of the Mississipi to the 
sovereignty of the Union. 

The rebel line of defense on this frontier ex¬ 
tended from Columbus, a powerfully intrenched 
camp on the Mississipi, eastward to the Alleghany 
mountains. About midway was Bowling Grein, 
another intrenched camp, where Albert Sidney 
Johnson commanded in person. East, towards 
the mountains, was Zollicoffer With a large force, 
where early in the winter he had taken up a for¬ 
tified position on the Cumberland river near Mill 
Spring. 

Against this line of defense Grant and the gun¬ 
boats under Foote were preparing to move on tho 
west; Buell was advancing on Bowling Green in 
the centre, while Thomas was in motion on tho 
east near the mountains. Thomas struck the first 



53 


blow and gave the country the firstlings of victory 
in the west. On the 19th of January he engaged 
the rebels at Mill Spring, defeated and routed 
them with the loss of their artillery, their in¬ 
trenched position, and their general, Zollicoffer, 
killed. The effect of this victory was to expose 
the whole rebel right flank by way of East Ten¬ 
nessee. 

On the left flank G-rant and Foote were moving 
to break the rebel lines of defenses by the Cum¬ 
berland and Tennessee rivers. It was clearly 
seen that, could these rivers be forced, the great 
rebel strongholds at Columbus and Bowling Green 
would be taken in reverse and their evacuation 
made a matter of absolute compulsion. But these 
rivers were barred by two strong works—Fort 
Henry on the Tennessee and Fort Donelson on 
the Cumberland. The former fell a prey to the 
gallantry of Foote’s naval attack, surrendering on 
the 6th of February, with its armament of sixty 
guns. 

A week after the surrender of Fort Henry, 
General Grant drew his lines of investment 
around Fort Donelson, and after a conflict running 
through four days and nights, and rendered 
memorable by the hardest fighting that had yet 
occurred in the war, the rebels were forced to 
aocede to General Grant’s demands for that 
“ unconditional surrender ” which has become so 
inseparably associated with his name. The sur¬ 
render included 15,000 prisoners and forty pieces 
of artillery. 

The fall of Forts Donelson and Henry promptly 
produced its anticipated effect. Columbus, which 
the rebels had styled the “Gibraltar of America,’’ 
was immediately abandoned. At the same time 
Johnston evacuated his intrenched position at 
Bowling Green and falling back to Nashville, or 
rather through Nashville (for the opening of the 
Cumberland to our gunboats, which resulted from 
the fall of the fort, made Nashville untenable), 
General Buell, whose army had been threatening 
the rebel force at Bowling Green, immediately 
followed up and took possession of that city. 
Thus it was that by the magnificent series of suc¬ 
cesses that illustrated the spring of 1862, the 
rebel line on a stretch of over five hundred miles 
was pushed back from the Ohio to the Cumber¬ 
land, and the whole State of Kentucky and a third 
of Tennessee were recovered to the dominions of 
the Union. 

Simultaneous with these operations the waters 
of the Mississippi were lit up by the splendors of 
Farragut’s astonishing combat below New Orleans 
with the forts, gunboats, steam rams, floating 
batteries, fire rafts, obstructions, booms and chains 
which the rebels had prepared for the defense of 
the great metropolis of the gulf, ending in the fall 
of that city, whose capture the London Times, 
doubting, with its usual cynicism, its possibility, 
had declared would be “ putting the tournequet 
on the main artery of the confederacy.” 

After their retreat from Columbus the rebels 
under Polk took up a new position on the Missis¬ 
sippi at Island No. 10. This stronghold was 
able for many weeks to hold out against all the 
operations directed against it, till finally the gun¬ 
boats run the gauntlet of the batteries, and the 
stronghold* with a hundred heavy guns, fell into 


our hands. From this point they fell back to 
Memphis only to be compelled to abandon that 
city, which in June following came under control 
of the Union forces. 

After the retreat of the central army of the 
rebellion from Nashville, it took up a strongly 
fortified position at Corinth, under Beauregard. 
There he was besieged by the Union army under 
Halleck, whose siego operations, pushed on to 
such a point as to make the capture of the whole 
force a matter of high probability, compelled the 
evacuation of this position also. 

The result of the victories of 1862 was thus to 
leave the situation in this gratifying position: 
Butler was at New Orleans, Curtis was pushing 
his way to Little Rock, the capital of Arkansas, 
the chief points on the coast were in our hands, 
Halleck was at Corinth, the Union flag waved 
over Memphis and Nashville, while Mitchell, in 
Alabama, was advancing from victory to victory. 

This was glory enough for one year, for if we 
turn our eye to the theatre of war in the East, 
we are presented with the spectacle of a cam¬ 
paign towards Richmond, in which the finest 
qualities of heroism in the army, gaining victories 
wherever it met the armed enemy, and driving 
him back to his capital were neutralized and 
rendered fruitless by the imbecility of its head. 
Turning upon McClellan, Lee terminated the of¬ 
fensive campaign by himself assuming the initi¬ 
ative, and carrying his army for the first time into 
the territory of the loyal States. The issue was 
at length tried out at Antietam, where the ab¬ 
sence off directing generalship could not prevent 
our soldiers from winning a victory, of which 
their commander had not the capacity to take 
advantage. Nevertheless, the first invasion of 
the rebels ended disastrously by their retreat into 
Virginia. 

VI. 

THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR—THIS 
BATTLE SUMMER. 

The first day of the third year of the war 
(1863) was signalized by the battle of Stone 
river or Murfreesboro, fought by Gen. Rosecrans, 
on the Union side, and by Bragg on the part of 
the rebels. The most desperate battle of the 
war up to that period, it inaugurated the year of 
great actions by an engagement which resulted in 
placing our army in Murfreesboro, with the pro¬ 
digious loss to the enemy of 14,560 men. This 
was to be followed up from this base by a bril¬ 
liant campaign in Tennessee, destined to culminate 
in the possession of Chattanooga, which had long 
been recognized by military heads as the key to 
the whole theatre of war in the West. 

In the meantime, Gen. Grant was drawing his 
lines of investment around the last great strong¬ 
hold of the rebels on the Mississippi, at Vicks¬ 
burg. Alter many attempts against this point, 
he finally, by an audacious stroke of strategy, un¬ 
paralleled save by Napoleon’s passage of the 
Splugen, crossed his army over the Mississippi at 
Grand Gulf, and, dividing the army of Johnston 
from the possibility of reinforcing the garrison at 
Vicksburg, beat the rebels in half a dozen battles, 
and ended by throwing his army as a besieging 




54 


force around this position. The siege of Vicks¬ 
burg will take its place in history, as among the 
most wonderful engineering operations on record. 
It was crowned by its unconditional surrender, 
on the 4th of July, with 31,720 prisoners and 234 
guns. At the same time, the garrison at Port 
Hudson surrendered to Gen. Banks, thus adding 
7,000 prisoners and 40 pieces of artillery to the 
account. The effect of these two victories, was 
to restore the national authority along the whole 
vast stretch of the Mississippi, and that great 
continental highway was thrown open to its em¬ 
bouchure in the Gulf of Mexico. 

At the very time that the right wing of our 
immense line of battle, stretching from the Poto¬ 
mac to the Mississippi, was thus engaged, its left 
wing, the army of the Potomac, was manoeuvering 
to meet Lee’s second invasion of the loyal States. 
The rebel army was brought to bay at length at 
Gettysburg, where a three days’ battle, the most 
colossal of the war was fought, ending in the 
utter defeat of Lee, who was fain again to make 
good his retreat into Virginia, with a loss of 
23,000 in killed and wounded and 6,000 prisoners. 

The centre of our great line, held by General 
Rosecrans, was at the same time on the advance. 
By a beautiful series of flanking movements, that 
commander drove Bragg from his two powerfully 
entrenched positions at Shelbyville and Tullahoma, 
and advancing from this point, planted his army, 
at one splendid stroke, in the central citadel of 
the South—Chattanooga. 

On the coast, the operations were being 
pushed on with equal vigor. Gen. Gillmore had 
effected a landing on Morris Island, whence, with 
his long range siege guns, he was ablb to batter 
down Fort Sumter, leaving that memorable 
stronghold, whose reduction by the rebels was 
the first overt act of the war a mass of ruins. 
Assisted by the co-operation of the iron clad 
fleet, the works on Morris Island—Forts Wagner 
and Gregg—were also reduced, and they with 
their armament fell into our hands. The posses¬ 
sion of Morris Island has enabled our fleet ever 
since to keep up a blockade of Charleston, which 
hermetically seals that place. 

Leaving out of view the single exception of that 
brief period during which the Napoleonic war in¬ 
volved all Europe in its conflagration, you will 
search all history in vain for a parallel of that 
great battle summer, whether as respects the 
vastness of the theatre of war, the proportions of 
the contending forces, or the substantial greatness 
of the results. During a single period of thirty 
days, embraced in this titanic epoch, not less 
than sixty thousand prisoners were captured. 
The losses to the enemy in this respect, added to 
his prodigious sacrifices in killed and wounded, 
left the Confederacy at the close of the year 
bleeding, prostrate and exhausted. 

* 

VII. 

THE FOURTH YEAR OF THE WAR. 

The opening of the fourth year of the war saw 
the forces of the rebellion driven from the whole 
circumfereuce of the Confederacy, and brought to 
definite points in two armies—the army of Brasrg 
on the mountain ridges south of Chattanooga, and 


the army of Lee on the Rapidan. The former 
assailed by Gen. Grant in his mountain fastnesses, 
saw himself driven from his stronghold, and his 
army broken and routed in the most disastrous 
defeat since Waterloo. He left in our hands 
10,000 prisoners and 60 guns, suffered a loss of 
8,000 in killed and wounded, and sought shelter 
for his shattered forces by a disordered retreat 
to Dalton. 

This review bring-s the catalogue of Union 
victories up to the time of the commencement of 
the great campaign of this summer, the events of 
which are too fresh in the memory of all to re¬ 
quire any detailed recital. 

During the early days of May, the two grand 
armies of the Union, under the supreme control 
of the Lieutenant-General commanding all the 
armies of the United States, began their advance, 
the one from Chattanooga, the other from the 
Rapidan. 

Gen. Sherman, after an advance from Chat¬ 
tanooga, over a hundred miles, marked by a 
series of brilliant manoeuvres and actions, in 
which the enemy’s forces were driven from a 
succession of strongholds, looked upon as im¬ 
pregnable, at length planted his army in front of 
Atlanta. Here he was thrice assailed by an 
enemy willing to lavish everything in desperate 
efforts to drive him back. . 

The enemy thrice met a bloody repulse. Sher¬ 
man now began working slowly but surely ’round 
on the rebel communications, not with a view to 
take Atlanta simply, but for the purpose of cap¬ 
turing the rebel army—a result from which Hood 
has only been saved by a precipitate flight from 
Atlanta—thus abandoning the foremost city of 
the Southwest, and the important communications 
it commands. In the engagement which resulted 
in this brilliant success, the rebels lost two thou¬ 
sand prisoners, and very heavily in killed and 
wounded. It may now be safely said that Hood’s 
force, as an army , no longer exists. 

In this great campaign General Sherman has 
put hors du combat over forty thousand men, that 
is, more than half the army opposed to him, 
besides effecting great captures in men and 
material. 

General Grant has planted his army before 
Petersburg}! and on the communications of Rich¬ 
mond, after a campaign of even greater magni¬ 
tude. marked by the most terrible and continuous 
fighting on record. During its progress he has 
gained a dozen victories, any one of which would 
have sealed the fate of any European war. Its 
course has been marked by the constant use of 
those double instruments of war—strategy, and 
what Wellington called “hard pounding;” by the 
former he has driven the enemy, by bloodless 
victories on our part, from six chosen lines of 
defense; by the latter he has put out of the way 
between fifty and sixty thousand of the fighting 
veterans of the South. In*addition he has taken 
over twenty-five thousand prisoners, and a pro¬ 
digious number of guns. He is certain, ere long, 
to crown his work by the capture of the rebel 
capital, and the destruction of the main rebel army. 

Finally, while the situation is as thus presented 
at the main points of war, the progress of our 
arms by land and sea shows equal lustre'wherever 




55 


they meet the foe. It is but the other day that 
Admiral Farragut capped the climax of his great 
achievements by the capture of the forts guard¬ 
ing the entrance to Mobile bay, the destruction or 
capture of the enemy’s powerful fleet in those 
waters—thus sweeping away, it is believed, the 
last vestige of rebel naval power on the coast of 
the Atlantic and the Gulf. From the high seas, 
too, the rebel naval power has been swept. It is 
but the other day that its most formidable em¬ 
bodiment, the Alabama , was sent to the bottom 
by the Kearsarge, affording a significant lesson 
both to the rebels and to the British allies who 
have furnished them with that and other proofs 
of their material support. 

yin. 

GROUNDS OF COURAGE AND CON¬ 
FIDENCE. 

After such a retrospect of the glorious achieve¬ 
ments of our army and navy, have we not a right 
to ask, with some emphasis, of those who com¬ 
plain of the slow progress of the war, and fear its 
indefinite prolongation, what substantial ground 
they have for their repining? It is true the 
course of the war has not been an uninterrupted 
succession of victories; it has presented the 
chequered aspect of successes and reverses which 
all wars present. But we ask any dispassionate 
observer, looking at the war by the map, and in 
the fiery characters in which it is writ all over 
the continent—contrasting the rebellion at the 

a start with the rebellion where it now stands— 
surveying this great struggle for the Union in its 
solid and substantial results —we ask such an ob¬ 
server to point out in the annals of war where 
more has been done in the same period. He will 
find it hard to point out where as much has been 
done! It is the common practice we know in 
war of popular Governments for men to belittle 
what has been done, to criticise and complain; 
but we ask in all seriousness, is it the part of dig¬ 
nity or of patriotism, in this crisis of our nation’s 
struggle, to depreciate its grand and providential 
achievements ? 

I There is, to a people battling in any cause, a 
force, purely metaphysical in its character, which 
is yet stronger than the sinews of war—stronger 
than the sinews of men’s arms. It is courage. 
Never has it been more needed than of late, when 
a fatal paralysis lias benumbed the public sense, 
and in the eclipse of faith, “the whole noise of 
timorous and flocking birds, with those that love 
the twilight, flutter about, and in their envious 
gabble would prognosticate a year of sects and 
schisms.” 

I believe we have already touched the nadir of 
our fears and our despondency, and that a breath 
of patriotism and hope is now vivifying the na¬ 
tional pulse. But each man can swell the rising 
tide. To diffuse the inspiration of courage, is the 
duty of every patriot. And happily we need 
draw this inspiration from no illusive fountains; 
for the more earnestly and honestly we look at 
the situation, the more grounds of hope we find. 
Some of these, grounds can be briefly set down : 

1. The body of the rebellion is moribund. Gen. 
T. Seymour, whose critical habit of thought and 


conservative temper, add a prodigious weight to 
any declarations he makes on this head, states as 
the result of his three months’ observation in the 
interior of the South, that “ the rebel cause is fast 
failing from exhaustion .” This is profoundly true, 
whether it has regard to the material resources 
in the South, or to the still more vital resources in 
men, of which the field is now reaped and bare. 
Every man and every boy is now in the field; 
there is nothing behind. In a private letter lately 
written by General Grant, he used the pungent 
expression that the rebels have “ robbed the cradle 
and the grave to reinforce their armies .” 

2. It is true, in inflicting on the rebels the im¬ 
mense damage they have received in the great 
campaigns of Grant and Sherman, we also have 
lost quite as severely—perhaps even more so; but 
(if it is lawful to speak thus of so grave a matter) 
we can afford it. We can stand to lose man for 
man, till every man in the armies of the rebellion 
is put hors du combat , and leave behind a force 
equal to all we have lost in the war. 

3. But I do not believe it will be needful to 
wade through such an ocean of blood as this. 
All that is needed is a blow that will disrupt the 
two main rebel armies. It is worthy of note, that 
the merciless conscriptions that have swept over 
the South have even simplified the problem for 
us. The war has no longer those thousand-fold 
embarrassments that attend a national war, or war 
on population. There is no population. Our task 
is confined to beating the armies at Richmond and 
Atlanta. For the rest, the southern people are 
tired of the war, and are sighing for peace. 

4. In a military point of view, such is tho situ¬ 
ation held by Gen. Grant and Gen. Sherman, to¬ 
ward the insurgent forces opposed to them, that 
the reinforcements they are receiving, will cer¬ 
tainly enable them soon to complete their work. 
Gen. Seymour on this head says : 

“ There is but one course consistent with safety or 
honor. Let the people awake to a sense of their dig¬ 
nity and strength, and a few months of comparatively 
trifling exertion—of such effort as alone is worthy of 
the great work—and the rebellion will crumble before 
us. Fill this draft promptly and willingly, with good 
and true men ; send a few spare thousands over rather 
than under the call, and the summer sun of 1865 will 
shine upon a regenerated land." 

5. The war is really near its close. The present 
front of the rebellion, menacing though it be, is 
really nothing more than a mask, concealing the 
hollowness and rottenness within. The South is 
literally exhausted—exhausted of that without 
which it is impossible to carry on war—exhausted 
of men. The field, in the impressive expression 
of Napoleon regarding France after her three 
conscriptions, is reaped down to the stubble. Out 
of an available fighting population of upwards of 
three quarters of a million with which the war 
was inaugurated, they have saved an effective 
force of one hundred or one hundred and fifty 
thousand men. The rest are in their graves, in 
the hospitals, disabled, or prisoners in our hands. 
These are the forlorn hope of the rebellion. 

6. Our territorial conquests have reclaimed 
three-fourths of the area originally claimed in the 
limits of the Confederacy. The Confederacy 
stands now thrice dissected—its great lines of 
communication cut or in our hands. Besides, its 




56 


resouroes of all kinds are all but exhausted. The 
desperate men at its head may continue the strug¬ 
gle for some time longer—they may for a while 
oppose a formidable front to our blows—but the 
rebellion is doomed. Its struggles will be the 
frantic final efforts of the gladiator before he falls 
down exhausted and exanimate. 

7. The leaders of the rebellion have ceased to 
seo any hope for their cause in the arena of war. 
They are looking now to the arena of politics. A 
party has been set up whose creed and aims have 
their entire sympathy and moral support. The 


platform of that party has nothing but expressions 
of contumely for the sacred war the recital of 
whicn has been made; for Jeff. Davis and his 
crew it has nothing but expressions of sympathy 
and respect. The people of the North have now 
before them the momentous question of deter¬ 
mining by their action whether they will justify 
all the precious blood shed in this war by carry¬ 
ing it triumphantly through and crowning it with 
a glorious and honorable peace, or whether by a 
base surrender they will project it into history as 
the monument of a nation’s folly. 


\x 


UNION CAMPAIGN DOCUMENTS. 

Orders sent to WEED, PARSOIVS «fc CO., will be promptly filled. 

| ' 

No. 1 .—Seward’s Speech at Auburn, Sept. 3, 1864. 

No. 2.*-Record of George H. Pendleton, with Plain Statement of Facts. 

No. 3.—Remarks of Hon. Reuben E. Fenton, at Jamestown, N. Y., 
Sept. 8, 1864, with Plain Statement of Facts. 

v Price, per hundred, $1.50; per thousand, $10.00. 

No. 4.—McClellan’s Military Career Reviewed and Exposed, &e. 

Price, per hundred, $3.00; per thousand, $26.00. 

No. 5.-—The Military and Naval Situation, and the Glorious Achieve¬ 
ments of our Soldiers and Sailors. 

Price, per hundred, $1.50; per thousand, $10.00. 

Electoral Ballots and Canvass Sheets will be furnished to Counties 
at reasonable rates. 




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